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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
    The question for decision in this appeal from dismissal of 
the claim for want of subject matter jurisdiction brought in an 
action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act is whether the 
activity complained of comes within a recognized exception to the 
Act.  The Plaintiff claimed that he slipped and fell in the 
Ceremonial Court Corridor of the William J. Green Federal 
Building and the Byrne Courthouse Building in Philadelphia 
because a film of water and ice was on the floor at the entrance 
to the building.   
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 The Federal Tort Claims Act vests exclusive 
jurisdiction in district courts for claims against the United 
States “caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of 
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of 
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United 
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act occurred.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b).  Title 28 U.S.C. § 2671 explains that “Federal 
agency” and “Employee of the government” do not include any 
contractor with the United States.  Thus, there is an 
independent-contractor exemption in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
 The district judge determined that any negligence causing the 
injury was that of the independent contractor (who was brought 
into this case as a third-party defendant), not that of the 
United States.  Therefore, the court concluded that Plaintiff's 
claim came within the independent-contractor statutory exception 
to the FTCA and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint for want of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  We affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
   The critical factor used to distinguish a federal 
agency employee from an independent contractor is whether the 
government has the power “to control the detailed physical 
performance of the contractor.”  United States v. Orleans 425 
U.S. 807, 814 (1976) (citing Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 
521, 528 (1973)).  “[T]he question here is not whether the 
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[contractor] receives federal money and must comply with federal 
standards and regulations, but whether its day-to-day operations 
are supervised by the Federal Government.”  Id. at 815.  The 
contractor here, Elwyn Industries, was given broad 
responsibilities for daily maintenance.  The contract 
specifically requires Elwyn to maintain an on-site supervisor, 
and explicitly states that “Government direction or supervision 
of contractor's employees directly or indirectly, shall not be 
exercised.”  App. for Appellant at 74a. 
 Alternatively, appellant argues that even if Elwyn 
Industries was negligent, the United States remains liable under 
Pennsylvania law as the owner and possessor of the building.  
There is a split in the circuits on this question.  Compare 
Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(interpreting Florida law and holding the government liable), 
with Berkman v. United States, 957 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(interpreting Virginia law and holding that independent-
contractor exception precluded governmental liability even though 
similar property owners might be liable under state law for 
injuries resulting from unsafe conditions).  We believe the 
Fourth Circuit offers the better reasoned analysis and we accept 
it as our own.  The Berkman court stated: 
Thus, while Berkman is correct in his assertion that, under 
Virginia law, the United States when acting as a 
landowner must maintain its property in a reasonably 
safe condition, Berkman must also show that federal law 
permits the application of this law to the United 
States.  This he fails to do.  The fundamental error in 
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Berkman's reasoning flows from the fact that the 
government of the United States can act only through 
people.  Furthermore, it is well understood that the 
government's activities are not performed exclusively 
by the government's employees and that independent 
contractors and subcontractors conduct a broad array of 
functions on the government's behalf.  Thus, the FTCA 
divides the universe of persons through which the 
United States may act into two general classes, 
“employee[s] of the government” and “contractor[s].”  
See U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671. 
   *     *     * 
 [W]e find nothing in the language of the act or in the 
legislative history of the FTCA to indicate that 
Congress considered the existence of a generalized 
liability, attributable to the United States based on 
any breach of a state defined duty.  By expressly 
waiving immunity for the tortious conduct of its 
employees and only its employees, the FTCA requires a 
more focussed approach that requires the courts to 
determine the relationship to the United States of the 
actor whose negligence might be imputed to the 
government under state law. 
 
Berkman, 957 F.2d at 112-113.  See Gibson v. United States, 567 
F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977).  
 
 We have considered all arguments advanced by the 
parties and have concluded that no further discussion is 
necessary. 
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
